Is Metaphysics a Waste of Time?

(Philosophy Pathways 171 – April 2012)

Metaphysics serves as a common foundation for the natural sciences and without it they would not, so to speak, have leg to stand on. So it is odd that these days the study of it is commonly dismissed as a waste of time. Perhaps to some extent it is a consequence of poor media management. Certainly a scientifically inclined layman reading the preface to The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, (2002 edition, Ed. Richard M Gale), a collection of essays by various authors, would have no difficulty in concluding that the subject is not worth their effort. It occupies only a couple of paragraphs but as a review of metaphysics it is devastating.

It is not an accident that none of the included essays attempt to say what metaphysics is, to describe the methods for doing it and the rules or criteria for assessing the success of a metaphysical theory. For all such metaphilosophical attempts have failed miserably.

It is difficult to see any other interpretation of this statement than that metaphysics is for people with nothing better to do. That such a statement can appear in such a context makes abundantly clear the failure of western academia to understand even the simplest thing about the metaphysics of the Buddha and Lao-tsu, perhaps even that there is such a thing, for this is a complete dismissal of it, and it seems equally oblivious to important parts of the Western tradition. Regardless, a person new to the topic, who might naturally assume that a respected publisher’s general guide might be a good first book to tackle, would almost certainly take it for granted that this statement is true, and if it is true then the rest of the book and the whole of the discipline would have to be a waste of time. If any doubts remain they are soon banished.

But the history of metaphysics, as well as the essays in this volume, shows that one can successfully engage in the metaphysical language-game even though one cannot articulate the rules of the game in virtue of which we can keep score and thus determine who wins and who loses.

It seems unlikely that many people would agree that engaging successfully in a language-game of this kind would be a worthwhile ambition or even a challenging one. A game for which nobody knows who is winning with rules that cannot be articulated, if such a thing is logically possible, would not be a game worth playing. What would it mean to ‘successfully engage’ in it? The next sentence nails the lid shut on the coffin.

Not all philosophers accept this favourable evaluation of the history of metaphysics.

It may be true, for truth may be stranger than fiction, that some philosophers hold a lower opinion of metaphysics than this. Far more important, however, and it is a fact that we might expect to see mentioned in this context, is that not all philosophers would judge this to be a favourable evaluation. Some would see it rather as a hatchet job. By what criteria might we judge this evaluation favourable? Does it not clearly state that metaphysics is an unscientific, inconclusive and largely pointless exercise?

…there are deconstructionists of traditional metaphysics who see it as a shocking scandal because it is a history of perennial and intractable disagreements. The disputants cannot even agree upon a decision procedure for resolving their disagreements. This demand for a cognitive discipline to have a decision procedure for determining who is right smacks of scientism…

How can a cognitive discipline have no procedure for making decisions? The idea is surely incomprehensible. In what sense would it be a discipline? The demand for a decision-making procedure carries no whiff of ‘scientism’. A person approaching metaphysics who does not make this demand might as well not bother. If metaphysics is not a science of logic then it is idle speculation. It is little wonder that so many scientists despair at the uselessness of metaphysics given this very public assessment of the discipline by a serious practitioner, nor that many people see the whole of philosophy as not worth their bother. Metaphysics is reduced to a farce by such words.

The only effective response to the deconstructionist’s scientistically-based indictment of metaphysics as meaningless is to do more metaphysics.

A less Orwellian language would have chosen the phrase ‘scientifically-based’, and the use of it would have made this a more clearly ludicrous statement. What would be the point of doing more and more metaphysics if we can never make any progress and have no method for measuring it even if we do? In what way would failing more energetically and more often be an effective response to scientifically-based criticism of metaphysics, or even a response at all? Those of us who see metaphysics as the only way forward for theoretical physics and scientific consciousness studies, the only discipline capable of a fundamental theory of any kind, must despair at the way in which it can sometimes be presented even by its friends. A great many metaphysicians hold a strikingly different view from the one presented in these pessimistic and frankly unscientific remarks, and would regard this characterisation of their field as unrigorous and dangerously misleading. Here is an alternative view, one that would be no less legitimate.

Metaphysics can be defined as the study of first principle or the world as a whole. Its task is to identify cosmological theories or ‘theories of everything’ which would contradict logic, reason or the scientific facts, and in this way sieve out those theories that would be most plausible as descriptions and explanations for the existence of the world and the phenomena studied by the natural sciences. The principle method by which it proceeds is that of dialectic refutation, the falsification of propositions by the derivation of contradictions. It is by virtue of the rules for the dialectic that we decide whether propositions are true, false, meaningless or undecidable.

The method works well and produces no results known to conflict with scientific observation or reported personal experience, an outcome that cannot plausibly be a coincidence. By the use of this formal method, the rules for which were codified by Aristotle, albeit with more subtlety than they may often be applied, metaphysicians are able to determine that all metaphysical position except one are logically indefensible, can be logically refuted, are ‘wrong’ according to the rules. This is the most important and best known result of metaphysics, the main reason why it is so difficult to do in the first place, and possibly the most important fact that an academic guide to the discipline could be telling us. If this were not the result of metaphysics, and if it were not very well-known, then there would be no justification for philosophical approaches such as ‘logical positivism’, ‘dialethism’, ‘naturalistic dualism’ and ‘mysterianism’, and nor would there be any justification for the dismissive remarks made about metaphysics in the Guide quoted here. It is only because metaphysics produces this result that it has such a long history of unresolved disagreements, for because of it we are led to argue endlessly for the truth of theories that are no more defensible than those of our opponents. Hence Kant’s observation that it is ‘an arena for mock fights.’

This result states that all positive metaphysical theories are logically self-defeating. It is only when this result is unacceptable to us, and clearly to many metaphysicians it is, or at least they see no alternative to rejecting it, that we need to question the rules of the game or even the point of playing it. In a reasonable universe we would expect a rigorous process of abduction to falsify all world-theories except one, perhaps two or three at most if they are nearly equivalent, and if this is what metaphysics does then it cannot be criticised for it. It is a result that we would expect, even hope for, and it gives us confidence in our method. There cannot be more than one completely correct metaphysical theory and, if the universe is reasonable, no more than one that is logically defensible.

What we find when we investigate metaphysics is that it does not endorse any partial, selective or positive world-theory. All such theories are found to give rise to contradictions such that if any of them were to be correct the universe would have to be paradoxical and remain forever incomprehensible to us. If metaphysics refuses to produce a positive result, however, then this does not mean that it produces no result. This is a result, and a very trustworthy one. It does not entail that we must dismiss metaphysics as useless but merely steers us towards a different kind of metaphysical theory.

The problem here, if there is a problem, is simply that the nondual metaphysical scheme of the Buddha and Lao-tsu now becomes highly plausible, and not all philosophers are prepared to investigate this potential solution. It is not illegitimate, for Nagarjuna, Bradley, Spencer-Brown and others have shown how it can be justified in logic, employing the same Aristotelian rules as we usually do. It is just unpopular and widely ignored, and even in modern consciousness studies has attracted little attention. Yet the situation is quite simple. For as long as metaphysics fails to demonstrate that the nondual metaphysical scheme endorsed by the Buddha and Lao-tsu is wrong, it will remain possible that metaphysics does its job admirably according to tried and trustworthy rules. Any other scheme will remain both redundant and implausible, requiring that we abandon the laws of thought and adopt a view we know can be refuted as a dialectic thesis and then have to defend this strategy by claiming that metaphysics has no method for making decisions.

The metaphysical scheme of Middle Way Buddhism, which to metaphysicians may be the most accessible form of the ‘perennial philosophy’ or ‘doctrine of the mean’, is not partial, selective or positive. It cannot be refuted in the dialectic as long as we stick closely to Aristotle’s rules and is the only cosmological doctrine for which this can be said. It is not demonstrably correct, and can never be so, for logic cannot prove what is true and false in reality, that is a matter for empiricism, but it is at least unique among metaphysical theories, if we treat it as such, in that it is not demonstrably wrong. On this view metaphysics is a quite straightforward study by which we eliminate logically indefensible theories to leave only those that might be correct, given only the starting assumption that the universe obeys the laws of dialectic logic or ‘laws of thought’, in order to produce a clear, reproducible and well-documented result. That this result may appear to be incomprehensible would be the central problem of metaphysics, not demonstrating it.

It is this perennial metaphysical result that divides discursive philosophers into two distinctive camps, often clumsily identified as ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’. From a certain perspective the defining difference for philosophers in these traditions would be their respective willingness to accept or understand the results of their own calculations. Nagarjuna, the most famous of all Buddhist philosophers, goes to great lengths to show that metaphysics produces a clear result and systematically proves what it is. There is no talk of changing the laws of thought, no apology for having no rules for deciding what is right and wrong. The result of Aristotelian metaphysics is presented as a proof of what is true, of what is the case. It is interesting to wonder on what grounds this information can be omitted from a modern guide to metaphysics.

If we take this more simple and optimistic view then we can explain why so many people, even many philosophers, consider metaphysics to be an unimportant or even pointless exercise. Such pessimism can be explained by the fact that the metaphysical scheme of mysticism is uninteresting to many people and therefore much misunderstood, thus widely considered to be a waste of time and certainly not a plausible solution for metaphysical problems. It must seem clear to most metaphysicians that mysticism has no systematic metaphysic underpinning all its fine talk of cosmology, soteriology, psychology and phenomenology and a dismissive view persists in large areas of metaphysics. The same view persists in physics, consciousness studies and all other disciplines where it is an orthodoxy that metaphysical problems are too hard to solve and metaphysics more or less useless. This is the fault of metaphysics. By leaping to this conclusion about mysticism metaphysics shoots itself in the foot, for if there is no systematic and logically defensible metaphysical scheme underpinning the teachings of the Buddha and Lao-tsu, and if all other schemes are logically indefensible, then metaphysics can never have a solution for its problems and must be useless as a path to truth, doomed to remain forever Kant’s ‘arena for mock fights’, a more descriptive phrase than ‘waste of time’ but closely equivalent, and will always be facing demands for a more scientific approach.

Fortunately, it has never been shown that this low view of mysticism is justified. This is to the credit of metaphysics. In metaphysics, if we play by the rules, we cannot dismiss the philosophical foundation of mysticism as either false or a waste of time, since we cannot show that it would give rise to logical contradictions. We cannot even show that it would not represent a solution to important problems. All we can do, and even then only on an individual basis, is to dismiss our method of refutation as a waste of time for failing to falsify it, as, in effect, the Blackwell Guide advises us to do. Only if it is false would we need to doubt a decision-making procedure that concludes it is true. There is nothing to stop us doubting our result, clearly not, but there is a high price to pay. Now we cannot complain when other people dismiss our discipline as unscientific or pointless, for it is ourselves who have made it so. Were we to stick to our method and pursue our analysis to its bitter end, then we would arrive where logical analysis always arrives, at the conclusion that all positive metaphysical theories are unsatisfactory. Now we face a simple choice. We can choose to see this conclusion as a dead end, or we can see it as a secure fact from which to derive an extended metaphysical theory. We have no other option. We cannot simply undo our calculations but must choose on which path to continue, where one heads West and the other East.

The confusion, depression and stagnation we see in our stereotypically ‘western’ philosophy is, on this view, caused not by its failure to produce a clear result but by its refusal to accept its clear result and to accept the consequences. The claim that we have no rules for decision-making might allow us to avoid having to accept this result but this is to deliberately upset the board at the last minute in order to avoid losing the game, which up until this moment we have been playing by the very rules we are now denying. Metaphysics is then reduced to the sham science described by the Blackwell guide to it. Such a metaphysics might well be thought of as a waste of time, for while it is capable of establishing the problems of philosophy it rules out of consideration the only available solution for them. This is not, however, all of metaphysics, merely a particular approach to it, one we have known not to work since the days of Plato. In addition to this approach there is the metaphysics of Parmenides and Zeno, Heraclitus and Plotinus, Kant and Hegel, Heidegger and Jung, Schopenhauer and Schrödinger, Bradley and Nagarjuna, Shankara and Plotinus, Bradley and Spencer-Brown, Lao-tsu and the Buddha. For this we would need to accept rather than fight against the results of metaphysics.

In answer to the question in the title, then, we could say that whether we see metaphysics as a waste of time will depend crucially on whether we accept its results or ignore them. In our Western tradition they are ignored, thus the negative evaluation that so many people award the discipline, while in the tradition of the East they are accepted, explaining not only the greater optimism but also how it is possible that the metaphysics of the East can appear so very different from ours that we may miss the fact that it would qualify as part of the same discipline. Having missed this, we are likely to find ourselves proposing that metaphysics is a game that cannot be won, not noticing that there is a vast and these days easily-accessible body of literature containing countless explanations of how to win.

It may not be an easy concession to make, that metaphysics and mysticism are not irrelevant to each other, that one may shine a light on the other, but once we make it then metaphysics becomes easier to do, at least up to a point. The demands that it makes in an academic context are considerable, but asking a metaphysical question and trying to answer it is all that would be required for actually doing it, and asking a few of them soon brings even the amateur investigator to the point where the two main traditions part company, which is on how to interpret the failure of metaphysics to reach a yes or no answer on any question of first principles. Now we have found the exit from the arena and must choose whether to stay or leave, choose whether to accept this strange result or reject it. Once out, if we choose to accept it, all theories except one can be abandoned and we can focus on reaching an understanding of just the one that remains, the one that predicts the failure of all positive metaphysical theories. Thus metaphysics becomes a lot easier to do, at least in the early stages, for those who do not try to fight against it.

When starting out. whatever our academic achievements, it is almost certain that we will adopt a more a less correct method. Aristotle’s rules for the dialectic are intended as a formalisation of the way in which human beings naturally and perhaps unavoidably think. We are normally using these rules effectively by the time we are able to talk. They describe the way our minds work, and we need not study the method in order to at least get started. We might perhaps start with the Something-Nothing problem, the question of whether the universe begins with, reduces to, is emergent from or simply is one or the other. This may be one of the more approachable of metaphysical problems. Discussions of it tend to be more brief and straightforward than for some others, even if they are ultimately no less confusing. Most people, if they ask themselves this question, will soon discover that the idea that the universe begins with Something or Nothing makes no sense. Both horns of this dilemma can be refuted in the dialectic, this is why they form a dilemma in the first place, and ideas that can be logically refuted never make sense to us. We may reach this conclusion after quite a short time and in a quite casual way but we should not doubt that it is an important philosophical result. It tells us something quite extraordinary about the universe and about the way in which we think. Perhaps it tells us that the universe is more extraordinary than we can think. Or, at least, it will if we trust our reason and accept this as a result and do not dismiss it as a failure of logic.

If we proceed in this fashion, approaching in turn the dilemma of freewill-determinism, externalism-internalism, mind-matter, one-many, dualism-monism and so forth, then we will eventually end up having to choose between the view that metaphysics and mysticism are in full agreement such that neither is a waste of time, and the view that metaphysics has no decision-making procedure and is a mock science, with the ineluctable implication that mysticism has no defensible philosophical foundation and is also a lot of nonsense. It is an all or nothing decision, and they must stand or fall together. There would be no requirement for us to work through all the different problems since metaphysicians have done the hard work. All we need do is confirm that the Something-Nothing problem and all similar ancient metaphysical dilemmas remain as much problems in metaphysics today as ever, something we can do by reference to a general introduction, an online browse or by extrapolation from the preface to the Blackwell guide to the subject. If all these questions are still problems today after centuries of painstaking analysis by thousands of greater minds than ours, then it can only be because all of their positive answers would break the rules of Aristotle’s game such that they must be judged unsatisfactory. Once we have noted that all these dilemmas are formed from pairs of contradictory and complementary positive metaphysical positions. then we have reached the fork in the path, the exit from the arena, and must decide whether to follow the Buddha or the Blackwell Guide.

If we choose the former, then rather than being self-effacing about our discipline we can say that if metaphysics has refuted all positive or partial metaphysical theories then this is its proudest achievement. It tells us what the world is really like, and in such a way that we might expect the scientists to sit up and take notice. Things would be different if there were no alternative to these refuted theories, if all metaphysical theories could be refuted, for then some despair might be justified. But if the alternative to these failed theories is the one endorsed by the Buddha and Lao-tsu, with all that this would imply for the natural sciences, the nature of reality, the meaning of life, the relationship between science and religion and who knows what else, then it would be difficult to argue that metaphysics is not a vital area of study. Only if we reject its conclusion would it have to become a snake-pit of competing theories none of which work, scorned by physics and consciousness studies for its endless prevarication, absent any method for making decisions or exiting the arena and having to print endless public apologies. If we do not reject it, then we can say that metaphysics it is a quite straightforward scientific or formal discipline akin to mathematics, one that may be used to show that all but one metaphysical theory gives rise to logical contradictions, this being in philosophy a form of global compatibilism as endorsed by all the world’s wisdom traditions, without need of further complication or fear of contradiction.

+++++++

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20 Responses to Is Metaphysics a Waste of Time?

  1. A lot to ponder here. I’m not clear what you mean by ‘phenomenon’. It doesn’t appear to be the Kantian use of the term as I understand it (phenomenon as the experienced object within the forms of our perception as opposed to the noumenon, the thing-in-itself). Does it refer to an object that can be potentially experienced?

  2. guymax says:

    Yes, it’s not a Kantian useage. For Buddhism Nirvana would be a phenomenon but would not be thought of as having an associated noumenon. I’m not sure it would be correct to say that this phenomenon can be experienced since this would imply a separation. What is said to be involved, (I am relying here on Elizabeth Reninger’s words on the topic), is a form of mystic intuition or apperception which goes into the realm of nondual perception of what Kant would call the “really real.” This has been called ‘reflexive-awareness direct perception’ and is a mode of perceiving in which the explicit “object” of the perception is an unconditioned “ultimate, unbounded wholeness.” Such an “ultimate, unbounded wholeness” is not actually an “object” in the usual dualistic sense, but rather is the very nature which IS that reflexive awareness. So yes and no. There would be no object to be experienced. Knowledge of ‘it’ (or ‘me’) would arise dependent on identity, or a realisation of identity, not a division of experience and experiencer.

  3. guymax says:

    Yes, or whatever is the original state. Kant defined this as ‘not an instance of any category’, and Hegel, delving deeper, called it a ‘spiritual unity’, then it is Tao, Brahman and so forth. By definition a unity cannot be a phenomenon that has a correlated noumenon. This would two things. All this is explained in one of the most elegant essays I’ve ever read, as it happens, for the Journal of Consciousness Studies. It was ‘Relative Phenomenalism’ by Edward Barkin. It may be online somewhere. He puts it all much better than I ever could. I always remember it because it was so well written.

    Relative Phenomenalism would be another name for Buddhism’s doctrine of ‘dependent origination’, which is one possible solution for the ‘problem of consciousness’, and he explains it by reference to Kant. Kant’s achievement in recreating this doctrine from scratch, in outline, by intellectual analysis, is pretty impressive. I’m amazed that so few people in consciousness studies take any notice of him.

  4. A reprint of the article is available for $26. I’m going to the library.

  5. guymax says:

    Ouch. I’ll post an extract that sums up what he says.

  6. I look forward to it.

  7. guymax says:

    Done.

  8. whitefrozen says:

    ‘It is not an accident that none of the included essays attempt to say what metaphysics is, to describe the methods for doing it and the rules or criteria for assessing the success of a metaphysical theory. For all such metaphilosophical attempts have failed miserably.’

    Correct me if I’m wrong, but if this is correct, then the proper name for metaphysics done under this guise is ‘bullshit’, ‘waste of time’, or ‘babbling’. That would go for anything, actually, that had these same parameters.

    • guymax says:

      Hi WF. Yes!! This is exactly what I was more politely proposing.

      Not a complete waste of time. Even this rather blinkered approach can refute all extreme metaphysical positions, and this is an important and hard won result. It would only become a waste of time if we reject this result and assume instead that metaphysics is a waste of time, as does the Blackwell Guide and most of university philosophy. If we accept this result then we have solved metaphysics and shown that it is a reliable guide to truth.

      • whitefrozen says:

        Reading it again, it’s actually pretty funny – it’s literally a scholarly, well-respected, academic book that opens up by saying, hey, we have no idea about how any of this works, or what it even is, or if anyone can even do it, and we’re pretty sure no one will ever figure any of that out. But here’s a bunch of essays on it!

        That, to me, is very, very funny.

  9. guymax says:

    Completely hysterical. Or very, very sad, depending on how we look at it. The effect on society is tragic. But yes, I was utterly amazed when I read the (very short) preface. As for the essays, I think I mostly understood two of them. The rest were much too complicated for me to understand.

    It is literally beyond my comprehension how anyone could say what is said in that preface, let alone someone who is thought to be capable of editing a book on metaphysics. Academia is a strange place. How could the publishers have let this through?
    .

  10. An interesting essay. I actually don’t think metaphysics can come to definitive conclusions, but I don’t see that as rendering it useless. Exploring possibilities is a valuable mental exercise.

    My concern with your assertion that eliminating all the metaphysical views with contradictions leaving only the eastern mystical viewpoint as valid, is that I doubt the people who hold onto those western or other metaphysical views could agree. If there were widespread consensus on the invalidity of those other metaphysical viewpoints, then it seems like they would cease to exist.

    While I do think metaphysics is a valuable endeavor, we have to be aware of the limitations. Metaphysicians predicted atoms, but not wave particle duality. I can’t see how they could have predicted quantum mechanics, since QM is so utterly bizarre. Some people insist that QM is logical, but if so, it is logic unsuspected before the empirical discoveries.

  11. guymax says:

    You have missed my message here SAP. Do you not see that everybody actually does agree about the results of metaphysics, and that even you do?

    You believe metaphysics cannot reach a definite conclusion. I’m saying that the reason you and many other people believe that metaphysics does not reach a definite conclusion is precisely because it does reach one. It is just that it does not reach any of the conclusions that you want it to reach. Everybody agrees that it reaches a definite conclusion, and a great many philosophers have proved it. Wittgenstein, Carnap, Russell, Kant, Hegel, Nagarjuna, even you and me, we all reach the same conclusion if we keep going long enough. It is what we do with this conclusion that distinguishes East from West. You say it is not a definite result, For Bradley, Nagarjuna and countless others it would the most important result of metaphysics.

    So the only difference between us is how we interpret the result of metaphysics. There is no doubting the result.; If you want to challenge the result then you would need to examine the arguments of Plato, Kant, Bradley, Hegel, Russell, Ayer, Carnap, Wittgenstein, Chalmers, Dennett, Priest, Melhuish et al and identify where they all went wrong.

    So I see your second para as simply wrong. There is a widespread and almost unanimous consensus. It is just that many people are allergic to mysticism, or do not know its philosophical scheme, so see a failure instead of a triumph. .

    • “Do you not see that everybody actually does agree about the results of metaphysics, and that even you do?”
      I’m forced to admit that I don’t. It seems like all we agree on is that most of us are wrong, but we don’t seem to agree on which is wrong and which is right. I fear I am probably missing your message. (Or we might simply disagree on it.)

  12. guymax says:

    I don’t think we really disagree. Perhaps I could ask why you believe that metaphysics does not reach a definite result. What would you cite as evidence?

    • Perhaps “definite” is the wrong word, because a viewpoint can be definitely wrong. But I don’t see how any metaphysical conclusion can be made authoritative, at least without it graduating into the realm of science as atomism did. Metaphysical conclusions, like most philosophical conclusions, are personal ones. For example, I’m a skeptic, but I fully admit that skepticism is a philosophical conclusion that can’t be proven, only advocated for.

      • guymax says:

        Do you not believe in law of non-contradiction? Suppose I had a theory that the universe is shaped like a cube and a sphere. Wouldn’t you conclude that one or both of these ideas must be wrong?

        This is all metaphysics does. Where a theory implies a contradiction it is rejected. All we need is the laws of thought. Or, we could just look at the history of academic metaphysics and see that it is, as Kant puts it, an ‘arena for mock fights’. Nobody has a theory that works, and everybody knows it. They all give rise to contradictions. This has been formally proved by a few philosophers, but clearly it what they all discover.

        You definitely have not decided any metaphysical problems. Why can you not do this? I would say it is because metaphysics produces a very definite result, and that no other result is possible. .

        The only way to avoid this result is to say that metaphysics is a failure and that this result is not a result at all, but the very definite absence of one. History shows that if we do this then we might as well give up metaphysics, since it will never make any sense to us.

        To make sense of it would mean going with the flow, not fighting the logic but making sense of it. It is true that contradictions can be hard to prove, but many greater minds than ours have worked on these problems and conclude that they arise. Otherwise there would be certain solutions that almost all philosophers would agree on. As it is, metaphysics is more randomly chaotic than economics.

        Simplified, it is just a list of metaphysical problems, all of which are undecidable.

    • I actually have no issue with eliminating contradictions. My understanding is that’s what happens in analytic philosophy, or at least what is attempted. The problem is that it often still leaves several possible answers with no way to adjudicate between them. I think there is value in understanding those possibilities, but see it as futile to declare my preferred answer is *the* answer. Others will simply disagree with my logic and continue to adhere to *their* preferred answer. All I can really do is declare it as *my* answer.

  13. guymax says:

    I do not see several possible answers, I see just two. But it looks like we’ll just have to differ about this. No worries.

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